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Abstract
We study whether and to what a large supplier facing a competitive fringe could
eﬀectively move the market of a depletable stock such as copper. We argue that
t h em e r ep o s s i b i l i t yf o rt h el a r g es t o c k h o l d er (i.e., leader) to sign forward contracts
signiﬁcantly reduces its market power. We show, for example, that in a three-period
setting the leader has no ability whatsoever to move the market.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the question whether and to what extent a large supplier (or a cohesive
group of suppliers) could eﬀectively move the world copper market has attracted increasing
attention among industry and market observers in Chile.1 In this paper we address this
question in a general context without going into the speciﬁcs of the copper market. Based
∗Liski (liski@hkkk.ﬁ) is at the Economics Department of the Helsinki School of Economics and Montero
(jmontero@faceapuc.cl) is at the Economics Department of the Catholic University of Chile (PUC). Both
authors are also Research Associates at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. We
have beneﬁted greatly from discussions with Juuso Välimäki. Montero thanks Fondecyt Grant No. 1030961
for ﬁnancial support.
1Chile produces about a third of the world’s copper mine production. See Meller (2002) for more.
1on the model developed by Liski and Montero (2003a), we will describe the equilibrium
properties of a market for an exhaustible resource such as copper and oil in which there is
a supplier with a large fraction of the total stock and a fringe of competitive suppliers with
the remaining of the stock.
The literature on the economics of exhaustible resources was pioneered by Hotelling
(1931), who provided a complete characterization of the equilibrium path when all the stock
is either in competitive hands or in the hands of one agent. A vast literature has followed
including several papers extending the Hotelling model to the case in which there is a large
stockholder that acts as a leader and a fringe of price-taker suppliers with rational expec-
tations (e.g., Salant, 1976; Newbery, 1981).2 These papers found that the large stockholder
always can move the market by shifting today’s production towards later periods.
In our paper we revisit the leader-fringe literature but drop the assumption that all
sales are done through the spot market (i.e., ﬂow sales). We open up the players’ action
space by allowing forward contracting and/or stock transactions (e.g., sale or purchase of
ac o p p e rm i n e ) .U n d e rt h i sm o r er e a l i s t i cs e t t i n g ,w eﬁnd that the leader suﬀers from the
very possibility of signing forward contracts (or engaging in stock sales) making his problem
closely resemble that of a durable-goods monopoly (e.g., Coase, 1972, Bulow, 1980): the
leader constantly wants to revise its sales strategy as time goes by and the stock decreases.
In fact, we show that in a three-period setting the leader loses all its ability to move the
market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop a three-
period simple example to introduce the problem and some of our results. Without providing
a formal derivation,3 in Section 3 we explain how the results of the simple example extend
to the more general case. We discuss areas for future research in Section 4.
2Most of these papers has been motivated by the market structure observed in the oil market.
3The formal derivation can be found in Liski and Montero (2003a).
22A n e x a m p l e
Consider the following three-period example. The demand for, say, copper (coming from
numerous price-taker consumers) in each period is pt = a − bqt,w h e r ept is the spot price
and qt is the total amount consumed at t =1 ,2,3. For the numerical exercise we will use
a =1 0and b =1 . The size of the initial stock is S0 =1 0 . We will assume that a fraction
α of this stock is in the hands of one strategic player that attempts to move the market
(we will use the index “m” to refer to this large stockholder). The remaining fraction of the
initial stock, 1−α, is in the hands of a fringe of competitive suppliers (we will use the index
“f” to refer to the fringe). There are no extr a c t i o nc o s t sa n dt h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei sr =0 .5.
We assume that both the fringe and consumers have rational expectations.
Let us ﬁrst compute the market equilibrium when α =0or α =1 .W h e n α =0
the equilbrium price path must satisﬁes Hotelling’s arbitrage condition that pt+1 =( 1+
r)pt (recall that there are no extraction costs). Imposing this condition together with the
exhaustion condition that all the stock is to be consumed within the three periods solves
for the equilibrium path which is shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 1. On the other hand,
when all the stock is in the hands of the leader, i.e., α =1 , the relevant arbitrage condition
changes to mrt+1 =( 1+r)mrt,w h e r emrt = a − 2qt is marginal revenue.4 Notice that
because the demand elasticity (in absolute terms) increases with price, the monopoly price
p a t hg r o w sa tr a t el o w e rt h a nt h ed i s c o u n tr a t er, as shown in the second column of the
table.
The equilibrium solution when the leader (i.e., large stockholder) and the fringe coexists,
i.e., 0 <α<1, is more involved. The leader’s problem is to chose a sales path that maximizes
its revenues subject to agents’ beliefs. For instance, in equilibrium we cannot have fringe
4During the writing this paper we came to realize that even the monopoly solution suﬀers from time
consistency problems when forward contracting is possible. We look at that problem in Liski and Montero
(2003b).
3members selling along a price path that is increasing a rate either lower or higher than r.
If we assume that transactions can be made only in the spot market, then the market price
will be realized on a period-by-period basis. Players must form rational price expectations
which can be found by backward induction. The equilibrium must satisfy the exhaustion
condition together with the following two arbitrage conditions: (i) pt+1 =( 1+r)pt must hold
for any two subsequent periods in which the fringe sells and (ii) mrm
t+1 =( 1+r)mrm
t must








t are the amounts sold by the fringe and leader, respectively, at t. In this Nash-
Cournot equilibrium, as commonly refered to in the literature despite the fringe members
do not set quantities (e.g., Salant, 1976: Newbery, 1981),6 w eo b s e r v et h a ti ti so p t i m a lf o r
t h el e a d e rt ol e tt h ef r i n g ee x h a u s tﬁrst and be the only one selling at t =3(see column 3
in Table 1). Although at t =3units are sold at a lower price in present value terms (which
explains the fringe’s absence), at the margin the leader receives the same revenue for these
units that for those sold at t =1and 2. Thus, the leader moves the market by shifting sales
to the third period (they are more than three times larger than under the competitive case)
in exchange of an increase in today’s prices. Note that the fringe beneﬁts from the presence
of the leader.
If we now open up the contract space to include forward contracting (which are quite
common in these markets) the Nash-Cournot equilibrium is no longer an equilibrium in
the sense that it suﬀers from a time-consistency problem that contradicts consumers’ and
fringe’s rational expectations. In this example, by forward contracting we mean that in
period t =1the leader not only sells its supply for period t =1but also oﬀers delivery
5Note that consumers are passive here. They only come to the spot market in every period.
6Newbery (1981) explains that if extraction costs are positive the Nash-Cournot solution may be time
inconsistent. He argues, however, that the time consistent solution is very similar to the Nash-Cournot
solution.
4contracts for period t =2and t =3 .7 In fact, if consumers believe that the equilibrium
price will follow the Nash-Cournot path discussed above, they should be willing to buy their
expected demand through forward contracts whose pricing follows the expected spot price
(the leader can always break the indiﬀerence in favor of its contracts using small discounts).
Having contracted its second-period sales, the leader has eﬀectively put this part of
his stock in competitive hands. Whatever happens to the price in the second-period spot
market, the leader’s revenue is already secured. This implies that the leader himself has an
incentive to bring part of the production that was originally allocated to the third period
t ot h es e c o n dp e r i o d . T h er e a s o ni st h a tt h em a r g i n a lr e v e n u ef r o ms e l l i n gm o r et h a nt h e
contracted amount in the second period spot market jumps up at the moment the original
supply becomes contracted.8
As shown in the fourth column of Table 1, the leader’s optimal deviation at t =2causes
the second-period price to drop from 7.011 to 6.234 imposing losses on both competitive
suppliers and consumers that signed period-2 forward contracts. Despite these losses, con-
sumers lack a coordination mechanism that in equilibrium will prevent any consumer from
accepting an attractive forward contract. The leader has no means to credibly communicate
that he will stick to spot transactions because at the moment this happens he starts signing
contracts. Thus, the Nash-Cournot solution cannot be the equilibrium of the game.
In equilibrium we have the leader maximizing proﬁts given (the correctly perceived)
expectations of buyers and the fringe, and these agents, in turn, are expecting (correctly)
that the leader will so behave. This implies that in equilibrium there cannot be revisions or
7The leader may decide not to oﬀer contracts for t =3without changing the results. If it does it can
always buy back part of these contracts at t =2(possibly after paying some previously agreed fee). This is
so because third period contract holders cannot do arbitrage since they cannot sell t =3deliveries earlier.
Only the leader can bring t =3deliveries to periods t =1and 2 b e c a u s eh eh a st h es t o c k .
8Note that the fringe can also make use of forward contracting but this does not solve the inconsistency
problem.
5l o s s e sb yc o n t r a c th o l d e r s .T h ee q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m em u s tb ec o n s t r u c t e db yb a c k w a r d
induction as follows. Consider for a moment that the leader only signs t =2contracts and
let qm
3 be the leader’ spot sale at t =3at price p3. If the equilibrium is to be any diﬀerent
from the competitive equilibrium the fringe cannot be selling at t =3 . Assuming that the






(1 + r)2 (1)
Thus, for the leader to not have incentives to deviate by making an unexpected spot sale at
t =2 ,w em u s th a v e
mr
m
3 ≥ (1 + r)p2 (2)
where mr3 = a − 2bqm
3 = p3 − bqm
3 .
Conditions (1) and (2), however, cannot simultaneously hold for qm
3 ≥ 0.10 Hence, the
equilibrium solution cannot be anything but the competitive equilibrium with both the
fringe and the leader selling in all three periods at prices rising at the discount rate r.
Only competitive pricing rules out the leader’s deviation incentives . Since in equilibrium
consumers and fringe members correctly anticipate the leaders’ deviation incentives (i.e., the
use of forward contracting for arbitrage puposes), the very possibility of signining contracts
destroys the leader’s credibility, and with it, its ability to move the market.
3 Building reputation
The possibility of forward contracting or stock transacting makes the leader’s problem very
similar to that of a durable goods monopoly in that the leader has incentives to revise its
9If α =0 .7, for example, the fringe sells everything at t =1in the Nash-Cournot solution.
10Note that if the leader has also contracted its third period, qm
3 =0and the “no-deviation” condition
becomes p3 ≥ (1 + r)p2 (some small fee from buying back part of the contracted deliveries may need to be
added to p3).
6sales strategy as time goes by and the stock decreases. In the example above we showed
that the leader has no ability whatsoever to move the market, while it can be demonstrated
(by backward induction) that the durable-goods monopolist can still reap some monopoly
proﬁts in a three-period setting (Bulow, 1982).
The durable good monopolist may also fail to charge prices above marginal costs if he can
move several times before the last sale, i.e., if the time interval between successive periods
of the game is arbitraily small. Because the durable-goods monopolist is always tempeted
to sell additional output as the game progresses, when the time interval approaches zero,
consumers expect the monopolist to ﬂood the market “in the twinkling of an eye”, and
hence, they will decline to buy at prices much above marginal cost (this is the Coase (1972)
conjecture).
Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) argue, however, that as the time interval becomes arbitrar-
ily small it is possible to have the durable-goods monopoly charging nearly static monopoly
prices in a subgame perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium consist of a main (observed) path
and a punishment path. The punishment path exhibits Coasian dynamics. The main path,
on the other hand, starts with a price equal the the static monopoly price and descend
at an arbitrarily slow pace. As the time interval approaches zero, adherence to the main
path becomes subgame perfect, because (by the Coase conjecture) the punishment becomes
increasingly severe.
In Liski and Montero (2003a), we use the same "reputational equilibria" concept of
Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) and ask whether the leader is able sustain the Nash-Cournot
path described above in subgame perfect equilibrium when the time interval becames arbi-
trarily small. Taken the (perfect) rational expectation equilibrium illustrated in the example
of Section 2 as our punishment path, we ﬁnd that the leader not always can build reputation
as to sustain the Nash-Cournot path. If its original stockholding is below a certain threshold,
the amount of the stock that the leader leaves for sales in the latter periods is so small that
7other players correctly anticipate that as soon as they start moving along the Nash-Cournot
path the leader would deviate. If the leader’s original stock is above the threshold, adherence
to the Nash-Cournot path becomes subgame perfect because now the punishment is more
severe in the sense that reversion to the competitive equilibrium aﬀects a larger remaining
stock.
4 Future research
There are several interesting directions for future reasearch. One of them is the implementa-
tion of an empirical test for a speciﬁc resource such as copper. This would bring new elements
to the model (e..g, extraction costs that are stock dependent) with no trivial implications
to the market equilibrium. It would also be interesting to explore the implications on the
equilibrium solution of asymmetric information regarding the size of the leader’s initial stock.
Since the leader is better informed about his stock, a large stockholding leader may need to
signal his size to separate from a smaller stockholding leader. A third reasearch avenue is to
extend our model to an oligopolistic environment with a few large stockholders (Lewis and
Schmalensee, 1980). If ﬁrms are of the same size and have identical extraction costs, it is
not clear to us that Lewis and Schmalensee’s results should change with the introduction of
forward contracting in a continuous time setting (they change in the discrete time setting).
If ﬁrms are of diﬀerent size and cost, as occur in practice, we beleive that ﬁrms that exhaust
their stock at a later time face the same deviation incentives that our leader has.
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Table 1. Equilibrium paths for diﬀe r e n tm a r k e ts t r u c t u r e s
9Competitive Monopoly Nash-Cournot Deviation
α =0 α =1 α =0 .6 α =0 .6
p1 4.211 6.053 4.674 4.674
p2 6.316 6.579 7.011 6.234
p3 9.474 7.368 8.316 9.093
q
f
1 5.789 — 3.6 3.6
q
f
2 3.684 — 0.4 2.989
q
f
3 0.526 — 0 0
qm
1 — 3.947 1.726 1.726
qm
2 — 3.421 2.589 0.777
qm
3 — 2.632 1.684 0.907
10